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Abstract I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the
Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to
meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian
moral and political theory, 1986) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with
rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential
rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice
offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and political theory, 1986; Law and Philosophy,
14:5–34, 1995) without harming his reputation for justice. And like the Foole, the
Invisible Foole dismisses the possibility that being just preserves goods intrinsic to
justice, and will be just only if he fears that others will punish his injustice by with-
holding the external goods like labor and material goods that he would otherwise
receive for their performance in covenants. I argue that given a plausible folk-theorem
interpretation, Hobbes’ response to the Foole’s challenge is inconclusive, and depends
crucially upon common knowledge assumptions that may or may not obtain in actual
societies. I present two analogous folk-theorem arguments in response to the Invisible
Foole’s challenge, one using the idea that the Invisible Foole’s power of concealment
might be transitory, and the other using the idea that members of society might stop
performing in covenants with anyone, thus punishing the Invisible Foole indirectly, if
the Invisible Foole commits sufficiently many injustices.
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The moral for Hobbesian political theory is that a great deal rests on a distinction
that Hobbes himself did not make—and that Hume (1998, 2000) perhaps only
glimpsed. This is the distinction between a society composed of rational, self-
interested agents and one where the rational self-interest of all agents is continuing
common knowledge. For the latter case, the Foole gives a compelling analysis. In
the former case, the Hobbesian shadow of the future can operate. How it operates
depends on the nature of the uncertainty of the members of society.
Brian Skyrms, ‘The Shadow of the Future’.
1 The Foole
One of Thomas Hobbes’ monumental contributions in Leviathan is an account of
natural law morality based upon a single idea: personal survival. When earlier
natural law theorists developed their accounts of the moral law, they relied upon a
variety of controversial theological and philosophical doctrines. Hobbes gives a
very simple definition of a natural law: A law of nature is a general rule that forbids
one to act in a manner that is self destructive or that deprives one of the means
necessary to preserve one’s life (Leviathan 14:3).1 One of the oldest and most
difficult problems of philosophy is what Gregory Kavka dubs the reconciliation
project, which is the attempt to show that acting morally or justly is compatible with
rational prudence (Kavka 1984, p. 297). For moral theorists working in traditions
such as Thomism, Kantianism and utilitarianism, reconciling the moral require-
ments of their systems with rational prudence is a very difficult task.2 Kavka
believes that most philosophers in our time think the reconciliation project is
doomed to failure (Kavka 1984, p. 297). But Hobbes has an elegant and perhaps
startling proposal for completing the reconciliation project. By adopting his
particular definition of a natural law, Hobbes makes the requirements of his moral
theory compatible with rational prudence by definition.
As Hobbes develops his account of the natural law, he considers a very important
challenge to one of its fundamental precepts. Hobbes introduces this challenge
through the words of a fictitious interlocutor, the Foole. Hobbes’ third law of nature
requires one to honor the promises one makes in a covenant. The Foole claims there
is no God (Leviathan 15:4). The Foole also claims that in certain circumstances, he
acts against rational prudence if he obeys Hobbes’ third law.
1 I give the chapter and paragraph number when citing a passage in Leviathan, section and paragraph
number when citing a passage in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and book, part, section
and paragraph number when citing a passage in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. For instance,
Leviathan 13:8 refers to the 8th paragraph of Chapter 13 of Leviathan and Treatise 3.2.2:22 refers to the
22nd paragraph of Book 3, Part 2, Section 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature.
2 Indeed, some moral theorists in these traditions might dispense with the reconciliation project by
denying its importance. For example, a Kantian might argue that a moral choice must not be motivated by
considerations of rational prudence, and hence one has no need to reconcile morality with rational
prudence. I disagree with this kind of inference, because I concur with Hume who maintains that one




the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of
performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the
parties promising; for such parties are no Covenants: But either where one of
the parties has performed already, or where there is a Power to make him
performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the
benefit of the other to performe, or not (Leviathan 15:5).
The Foole is aware that if he enters into an covenant with another who honors her
promise and performs first, then he has already received whatever benefits were
promised him by the terms of the covenant. In this instance, the Foole claims he
should not keep his promise. For if he did so, he would incur a cost to himself with
no expectation of any additional benefit.
What happens if a party to a covenant who is to perform first agrees with the
Foole’s reasoning? David Hume has a response to this question in A Treatise of
Human Nature. Hume has us consider an example:
Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. ‘Tis profitable for us both, that
I shou’d labour with you to-day, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow. I have no
kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take
any pains on your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in
expectation of a return, I know I shou’d be disappointed, and that I shou’d in vain
depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You treat me
in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for
want of mutual confidence and security (Treatise 3.2.5:8).
Skyrms (1998) and Vanderschraaf (1998) summarize the situation the two farmers
confront as an extensive form game, characterized by the tree diagram in Fig. 1.3
Fig. 1 The farmers’ dilemma
3 Following the usual convention, in a 2-player extensive form game the first (second) component of the
ordered pair at an outcome is the first (second) player’s preference or payoff. For example, at the D, H-
outcome Farmer 1 is at her least preferred outcome in the game and Farmer 2 is at his most preferred
outcome in the game.
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Using the Fig. 1 game, one can paraphrase Hume’s argument as follows: Farmer 1
reasons that if she were to choose P, then Farmer 2’s best response would be to
choose D. So Farmer 1 rules out the P, P-outcome, and must decide between
choosing P and arriving at the P, D-outcome or choosing D. Since the P, D-
outcome is Farmer 1’s worst outcome, to avoid this outcome Farmer 1 will choose D.
Farmer 2 will then choose D, his best response. According to this backwards
induction analysis, the two farmers will follow the unique equilibrium of this game
where each chooses D. Skyrms (1998) and Vanderschraaf (1998) credit Hume with
recognizing the basics of the backwards induction analysis of this extensive form
game.
In fact, Hobbes and Hume both maintain that self-interested agents can have
good reason to perform in covenants. They think that those who reason as do the
Foole and the farmers make the mistake of analyzing the costs of performing in a
covenant and the benefits of others’ performance as if this covenant were the only
covenant relevant to their interests. In ordinary circumstances, a single interaction
like the commitment problem Hume’s farmers face is embedded in a complex
sequence of social interactions that occur over time. If one reasons that she can
expect many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation with others in her
community, then if one honors her promise made in a covenant and performs on a
given occasion, she indicates to others that she will perform on other occasions, so
that they will be willing to make and perform in covenants with her in the future. As
Hume puts it,
I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness;
because I forsee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the
same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices
with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have serv’d him, and he is in
possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is induc’d to perform
his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal (Treatise 3.2.5:9).
What about the Foole’s claim that he should not reciprocate, but should instead fail
to perform when the time comes? Such failure constitutes what Kavka terms an
unexpected unilateral or offensive violation of the third law (1986, p. 139; 1995,
p. 8). Hobbes and Hume give similar warnings against offensive violation. Hume
declares that
When a man says he promises any thing, he in effect expresses a resolution of
performing it; and along with that, by making use of this form of words,
subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure
(Treatise 3.2.5:10).
In his response to the Foole, Hobbes argues that
He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he
thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that
unite themselves for Peace and Defense, but by the errour of them that receive
him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of
their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means
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of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth;
and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men,… (Leviathan 15:5).
Hobbes and Hume recognize that one who follows the Foole’s advice and
offensively violates the third law might enjoy an immediate gain by taking
advantage of others’ compliance. However, they also maintain that prudentially
rational and well-informed agents will not perform in covenants with one who has
offensively violated a covenant in the past. Hobbes and Hume maintain that if
someone like the Foole is guilty of a past offensive violation, the others in society
who know of his guilt will violate defensively against him.4 The expected loss of
future benefits of others’ performance in future covenants far outweighs any
immediate gain from a single offensive violation, think Hobbes and Hume.
This kind of rebuttal to the Foole is a justice-conventionalist rebuttal
(Vanderschraaf 2003). The Foole specifically challenges the prudential rationality
of following Hobbes’ third law of nature, which requires one to honor one’s end of a
covenant. As Kavka notes, all the Hobbesian laws of nature have the same two-part
structure: a main clause that summarizes a moral requirement one must not violate
offensively, and a secondary clause that specifies when one may violate the
requirement defensively, that is, when one expects others to violate the requirement
and wants to avoid exploitation (1986, pp. 344–349; 1995, p. 8). So one can apply
the basic logic of the Foole’s argument to all the laws of nature and view the Foole’s
challenge as a challenge to the entire reconciliation project. Justice-conventionalists
argue that to follow moral requirements is generally to one’s benefit because this
encourages the others in society to act cooperatively towards oneself. Justice-
conventionalism is the tradition of Hugo Grotius, David Hume and Thomas Hobbes.
This tradition is very well represented in our time by Ken Binmore, David Gauthier,
Gregory Kavka, Brian Skyrms and Robert Sugden. Justice-conventionalists argue
that one must be just in order to help generate and maintain a system of reciprocal
expectations that the members of society will follow mutually beneficial practices
such as respecting property rights. Indeed, this argument forms part of an analysis of
justice for the justice-conventionalist, that is, the particular norms of justice in a
society are precisely those rules its members follow because they expect to enjoy
mutual benefits by following them.
2 The shepherd
In Republic, Plato (1992) considers several alternative accounts of justice, including
a proto-contractarian account Glaucon proposes early in Book II.
They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad, but
that the badness of suffering it so far exceeds the goodness of doing it that
those who have done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack the
power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is profitable to come to an
agreement with each other to do injustice, not to suffer it. As a result, they
4 As with ‘offensive violation’, the term ‘defensive violation’ is due to Kavka (1986, p. 139; 1995, p. 8).
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begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call
lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It is an
intermediate between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without
paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge.
Justice is a mean between these two extremes (Republic 358e–359b).
According to Glaucon’s discussion, one’s best outcome evidently occurs when one
does injustice against others who cannot punish the injustice. One’s worst
outcome evidently occurs when one is the helpless victim of injustice. An
intermediate outcome occurs when all act justly. Suppose that one can adopt one
of three strategies: Be unjust (U) and try to exploit others, be just (J) and act
cooperatively with others who are not unjust and retaliate against those who are
unjust, and be a victim (V) and render oneself helpless, say by taking a drug. Then
one arrives at one’s best outcome when one follows U and the others follow V.
One arrives at one’s worst outcome when one follows V and the others follow U.
An intermediate outcome occurs when all follow J. Glaucon assumes that all
prefer the state where all are just over the state where all are unjust, so I will
assume that all strictly prefer the all-J outcome over the all-U outcome. Finally, I
will assume that a just person strictly prefers that others are just over others being
victims, and both just and unjust persons prefer that others are victims over others
being unjust. That is, I suppose that a just person would rather enjoy the benefits
of the active cooperation of other just persons over the passivity of victims, and
that both just and unjust persons rank the outcome of conflict with unjust persons
lower than the outcomes of meeting victims. Then one can summarize Glaucon’s
proposal with the Fig. 2 matrix.5 The Fig. 2 matrix characterizes a game in
strategic form.6 According to this interpretation, justice emerges and remains
stable because the all-J outcome is the unique optimal equilibrium. The all-U
outcome is also an equilibrium, but this equilibrium is evidently ‘‘fragile’’. If the
others follow U, then U is a best response, but so is J. So if one deviates from the
all-U outcome and follows this other best response J, then J becomes the others’
unique best response to the deviation.
Glaucon does not merely assume that people regard being unjust against helpless
victims as the best outcome, being a helpless victim of injustice as the worst, and all
being just as somewhere in between. He defends his claim that one’s best outcome
is to do injustice against helpless victims with one of philosophy’s most celebrated
thought experiments. Glaucon repeats a fable of a Lydian shepherd referred to as the
ancestor of Gyges. The Lydian shepherd finds a ring, and soon discovers that when
he wears the ring he can render himself invisible to others at will. With his
newfound power, the shepherd kills the king of Lydia and takes over the kingdom
(Republic 359d–360b). Glaucon thinks the moral of the fable is clear: Anyone who
possesses the power to act as if he were a god among humans, and in particular can
5 The Fig. 2 matrix oversimplifies the structure of the encounter somewhat because it summarizes the
outcome where one’s counterparts in the encounter all follow the same strategy.
6 Again following the usual convention, in a 2-player strategic form game the first (second) component of
the ordered pair at an outcome is Player 1’s (Player 2’s) player’s preference or payoff.
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commit any injustices against others with perfect impunity, has no reason to be just
(Republic 360b–360c).
Socrates does not challenge the conclusion Glaucon draws from this thought
experiment, though he might have done so. For the invisibility ring did not give the
Lydian Shepherd the power to commit injustices with perfect impunity. With the
ring, shepherd had the power of invisibility, but not the power of invulnerability.
Indeed, a blind assassin with heightened senses of hearing and smell might have
been able to dispatch the shepherd even while the shepherd was using his ring. In
any event, Glaucon proceeds to argue that the real good of justice is the good
reputation one typically gains from being just. Glaucon suggests that the outcome
best for oneself is to do the greatest injustice while maintaining the greatest
reputation for justice (Republic 362a–362b). Glaucon’s discussion of the importance
of reputation suggests an alternate moral of the fable of the Lydian shepherd: One
has no reason to be just if one has the power to perfectly conceal one’s identity
when committing injustices. For then one cannot damage one’s reputation when one
commits injustices. Presumably the shepherd had a reputation for being just before
he found the ring. The shepherd might have used his ring differently. Rather than
setting himself up as the tyrant over the Lydians, he might have committed
injustices against various Lydian people, exploiting them while invisible, but never
revealing that it was he who possessed the ring. Then the Lydians apparently would
have been helpless victims, but not because the shepherd was acting like a god
among humans. The Lydians would simply not have known who to punish when the
shepherd exploited some of them while invisible.
Glaucon, and later Adeimantus, challenge Socrates to show that someone who is
bound to have a perfect reputation for injustice still has a good reason to be just and
that someone who is bound to have a perfect reputation for justice still should
refrain from being unjust. And Adeimantus anticipates the sort of argument he
thinks Socrates will have to give.
Socrates, of all of you who claim to praise justice, from the original heroes of
old whose words survive, to the men of the present day, not one has ever
blamed injustice or praised justice except by mentioning the reputations,
honors and rewards that are their consequences. No one has ever adequately
described what each itself does of its own power by its presence in the soul of
Others 
V J U
V (3rd,3rd) (3rd,3rd) (5th,1st)
Myself J (3rd,3rd) (2nd,2nd) (4th,4th)
U (1st,5th) (4th,4th) (4th,4th)
V =  victim, J =  just, U =  unjust 
Fig. 2 Justice as a mean
between extremes
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the person who possesses it, even if it remains hidden from gods and humans.
No one, whether in poetry or in private conversations, has adequately argued
that injustice is the worst thing a soul can have in it and that justice is the
greatest good. If you had treated the subject in this way and persuaded us from
youth, we wouldn’t now be guarding against one another’s injustices, but each
would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing injustice he’d be living
with the worst thing possible (Republic 366d–367a).
Adeimantus rightly notes that in order to meet the challenge he and Glaucon have
laid out, Socrates must show what Adeimantus thinks no one has ever shown.
Socrates must show that there is some good intrinsic to justice that is so valuable
that one is better off being just even if one has a perfect reputation for injustice and
suffers the consequences of having such a reputation. Such a justice-Platonist
defense of the prudential rationality of justice must maintain that justice brings with
it a good or goods unlike goods such as money, material goods or labor that one can
obtain by means other than being just (Vanderschraaf 2003, p. 145). A justice-
Platonist may allow that some combination of the intrinsic and the external goods of
justice gives one good prudential reason to be just. But Glaucon and Adeimantus
turn the screws on Socrates, insisting that Socrates defend the prudential rationality
of justice in terms of its supposed intrinsic goods only. Justice-Platonism is the
tradition of Aquinas, Aristotle and of course Plato himself. In somewhat different
ways, John Finnis, Alasdair MacIntyre and John Rawls are prominent justice-
Platonists in our own time.
Adeimantus even identifies in advance the good that Socrates will argue is both
the greatest human good and the good intrinsic to justice, namely, a soul free from
the corruption that injustice causes. To be sure, this is not the only good one might
claim is intrinsic to justice. For example, Aquinas gives a justice-Platonist argument
for the prudential rationality of respecting property rights when he argues that theft
is a mortal sin (Aquinas II.II Q. 66). For Aquinas, if one commits this kind of
injustice then one is liable to be excluded from Heaven in the next life. Socrates’
key problem, as Adeimantus knows, is that if he accepts the challenge, then he must
give some sort of justice-Platonist argument in favor of justice since he may not
appeal to any of the goods that come with having good offices with others, as do
Hobbes and Hume.
Adeimantus seems to think that Socrates has little prospect of mounting a
successful justice-Platonist argument. Some recent authors who discuss Glaucon’s
thought experiment also appear to take a dim view of justice-Platonist arguments
(Gauthier 1990; Copp 1997). Of course, Socrates accepts the challenge and gives
exactly the sort of justice-Platonist argument Adeimantus expects. One of the core
positions Plato defends in Gorgias and Republic is the following: If one commits an
injustice and thus becomes unjust, this causes one’s soul to become corrupt, and to
have such a corrupt soul is the worst misfortune one could suffer. Socrates insists
that rational prudence requires one to be just in order to maintain one’s greatest
good, namely, a healthy soul. I will not consider the merits of Socrates’ arguments
here. Instead, I will consider what, if any, moral Hobbes and Hume should draw
from the fable of the Lydian shepherd.
44 P. Vanderschraaf
123
3 Enter the Invisible Foole
Neither Hobbes nor Hume explicitly acknowledges the challenge Adeimantus and
Glaucon raise in Republic. Perhaps they think they have no good reason to consider
this challenge. After all, Hobbes and Hume are concerned with analyzing social life
in the actual world, not the world of mythology. They might claim that no
invisibility ring or any other technology that would enable one to perfectly conceal
one’s identity has ever existed, and consequently Glaucon’s thought experiment is
irrelevant to their analyses of the prudential rationality of justice. They might say
that one should concentrate on the skeptical challenge the Foole raises, and not
worry about the Lydian shepherd and Glaucon’s thought experiment.
But perhaps one should not dismiss Glaucon’s challenge on these grounds so
quickly. True, no technology we know of can render someone invisible. However,
one can take a variety of measures that will make one’s identity exceedingly hard to
detect in a variety of settings. One might attack and rob a pedestrian on a badly lit
sidewalk while wearing a disguise, and leave the victim nursing his wounds and
wondering, ‘‘Who was that masked man?’’ One might purchase goods using a stolen
credit card number, and leave it to the credit card owner to deal with the surprise
additional charges that will appear on his bill. And so on. One might regard the
power of the shepherd’s ring as a limit no one can actually reach, but also a limit
many can approach quite closely. So Hobbes and Hume should regard Glaucon’s
challenge as more than an irrelevant thought experiment. Given how many ways
one can render oneself in effect almost invisible, an argument for why one who
possesses the invisibility ring is still better off if he honors the requirements of
justice would be a valuable weapon in their arsenals.
Moreover, given Hobbes’ assumptions regarding his Foole, such an argument will
have to be a justice-conventionalist argument. Suppose the Foole acquires the ring
that once belonged to the Lydian shepherd. Now he can turn invisible whenever he
wishes, so I will rename him the Invisible Foole. And suppose further that after some
experimentation the Invisible Foole learns that the ring has another power the
shepherd did not notice. Using the ring, the Invisible Foole can appear to others as
some person other than himself. With the ring, the Invisible Foole can enter into
covenants appearing to be someone else and then turn invisible and abscond when it
is his turn to perform. He can commit injustices at will against others all the while
concealing his identity perfectly. After he completes his direct reply to the Foole,
Hobbes states that the only way one can gain the felicity of Heaven is to obey the law
of nature that requires one to keep covenants (Leviathan 15:6). But the Invisible
Foole still does not believe in God, so he would scoff at Hobbes’ statement, just as he
would scoff at a Thomist who gives him a similar warning against unjust conduct. If
we suppose that the Invisible Foole accepts Hobbes’ materialism and mechanistic
account of life in Leviathan, then we may surmise that the he would regard Socrates’
talk of a corrupt soul as meaningless, same as ‘‘if a man should talk to me of a round
quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese,… (Leviathan 5:5)’’. Indeed, the
Invisible Foole appears to have no use for any talk of goods allegedly intrinsic to
justice. Before he had the ring, the Foole seemed interested in only external goods
such as money and labor he would willingly seek by being just if he had to, but would
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seek by other means that would spare him the costs of being just if he could. If we
suppose that the Invisible Foole cares for only these sorts of external goods, then of
course no justice-Platonist argument will make any impression upon him. Hobbes’
Foole claimed that injustice is the better course of action if he receives the benefits of
the others’ justice no matter what he does. The Invisible Foole appears to have the
power to ensure that he is indeed guaranteed to receive the benefits of others’ justice
whatever he may do. Since many real people possess powers that approximate those
of the Invisible Foole, Hobbes and Hume face a serious new challenge to their
justice-conventionalist reconciliation of just conduct with rational prudence.
4 The folk-theorem interpretation of Hobbes’ response to the Foole
Before dealing with the Invisible Foole further, I will take a step back and
reconsider Hobbes’ Foole as he was in Leviathan, with no invisibility ring. Hobbes
maintains that the Foole’s reasoning is flawed, and that the Foole should not
offensively violate a covenant. Many interpretations of Hobbes’ response to the
Foole appear in the literature. However, I think the most natural way to interpret
Hobbes’ response is also one of the simplest. I will call this interpretation the folk-
theorem interpretation. Robert Sugden (1986, pp. 165–169) and Brian Skyrms
(1998) were perhaps the first to clearly recognize and articulate this interpretation.7
Hobbes, and later Hume, attribute to those who interact with individuals like the
Foole and the corn farmers a policy I summarize as the Humean strategy
(Vanderschraaf 2007, p. 177)8:
H: Perform (P) in a covenant with innocent counterpart parties of the
covenant, and do not perform (D) with guilty counterparts.
where a counterpart is guilty in case he has offensively violated a covenant in the
past, and is otherwise innocent.9 Perhaps the simplest nontrivial example of the
Humean strategy in practice takes place in a community of two, where each must
decide whether or not to perform in covenants with the other without knowing in
advance what the other decides. The Fig. 3 Prisoners’ Dilemma summarizes the
structure of such covenants.
7 One might also call this interpretation the shadow of the future interpretation since Skyrms presents a
particularly fine presentation of the folk theorem interpretation in his essay ‘The Shadow of the Future’
(1998).
8 I call this strategy the Humean strategy because I think Hume articulates the supposed consequences of
offensive violation more clearly than does Hobbes.
9 The Humean strategy is unambiguous if one assumes that an H-follower follows this strategy perfectly.
If one allows that individuals can fail to follow H perfectly, then one needs to specify the conditions for
innocence and guilt in case one deviates from H unilaterally with an innocent or guilty party. Hobbes and
Hume do not consider this possibility. If individuals can fail to follow H perfectly, then I prefer to define a
counterpart as guilty in case he has offensively violated or has performed in a covenant with another
guilty counterpart in the past. This condition gives individuals greater incentive to bear the costs of
punishing the guilty even when they are not the victims of past offensive violations.
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In the Fig. 3 game, gi is the extra gain Party i achieves if Party i successfully
exploits his counterpart Party j by following D when Party j follows P. An exploited
Party j suffers a loss -lj when Party j follows P and counterpart Party i follows D.
This Prisoners’ Dilemma is a close relative of the Farmers’ Dilemma game of
Fig. 1. However, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is structurally simpler than the Farmers’
Dilemma because the former has no sequential structure. If the two parties are to
enter into a single covenant only, then neither will perform because D is the strictly
dominant strategy for each. But if the parties are to engage in a sequence of
Prisoners’ Dilemma games, then they have available to them a great many new
strategies other than following P all of the time or D all of the time. Under certain
conditions, they can also settle into a variety of different equilibria of the
indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, some of which they prefer over others.
John Nash first discovered this in 1950, and his proof of this result established the
first folk theorem in game theory (Flood 1958).10 The folk theorems are a growing
body of results that identify the set of discounted average payoffs in an indefinitely
repeated game for each of the players that can be sustained by some equilibrium of
this repeated game.11 In the indefinitely repeated Fig. 3 Prisoners’ Dilemma, if each
party follows the strategy of choosing D in each round of play, then they follow an
equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game. Vanderschraaf (1998) and Skyrms
(2004, pp. 4–6) show that if the parties can also adopt the Humean strategy, then
their game is transformed into a Stag Hunt game.12 Figure 4 summarizes the
structure of this Stag Hunt when the Prisoners’ Dilemma has the Fig. 3 payoffs.
Party 2
P D
Party 1 P ( )1,1 ( )1 2,1l g+
D ( )1 21 ,g l+ ( )0,0
P = perform, D = do not perform
0ig > , 0il > , 1i ig l < , { }1, 2i
Fig. 3 Prisoners’ dilemma
10 Flood (1958) reports that Nash shared his proof with him in a private correspondence. Nash never
published his folk theorem.
11 Game theorists today refer to these results as folk theorems because early game theorists knew of and
discussed some of these results informally for years before the first published proofs of these results
appeared in the literature.
12 Stag Hunt gets its name from Rousseau’s example in Part II, Paragraph 9 of Discourse on the Origins
of Inequality where a party of hunters can catch a deer if all work together, but each hunter is tempted to
break from the deer hunt to capture a less desirable but immediately available hare. David Lewis proposes
modeling Rousseau’s Stag Hunt as this kind of coordination game (1969, p. 47). Gauthier (1979) and
Skyrms (2004, Chapter 1) argue that Hume gives even earlier examples of coordination problems with a
Stag Hunt structure in A Treatise of Human Nature.
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Suppose the parties do not know how many times they will enter into covenants
with each other, that is, nether knows the value of m, but each expects that
m [ 1 ? gi, where again gi is the extra gain (and -lj is the counterpart’s loss) if
Party i successfully exploits his counterpart in one Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Then
(H, H) and (A, A) are both equilibria of the indefinitely repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma, and both parties would prefer to follow (H, H) over following (A, A).
Note that as this indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is played out by a fixed
pair of counterpart parties, the Humean strategy in this case is equivalent to the
strategy for playing repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with a fixed counterpart known as
grim trigger (Axelrod 1984).
Of course, the Foole is not likely to live in a community of only two. The Foole can
rightly observe that the game relevant for analyzing his challenge is likely to resemble
a sequence of Prisoners’ Dilemma games he plays out with members of a larger
community where he might interact with different counterparts over time. If we
continue to assume that the pure strategies community members might follow are A
and H, this repeated game is summarized by Fig. 5. Here the Foole is Party i. At each
period t of play, the Foole meets a counterpart Party i(t), who might be a different
counterpart than those the Foole meets at other periods. Using the Fig. 5 diagram, one
can summarize the folk-theorem interpretation of Hobbes’ response to the Foole this
way: At the initial round of play, if the Foole follows D, then he violates offensively
and gains the payoff 1 ? gi that includes the extra gain gi of exploiting Party i(1), who
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Fig. 4 Stag hunt: prisoners’
dilemma repeated m times
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follows P. But afterwards the Foole receives no positive payoff because the other
counterparts he meets violate defensively and follow D when they meet the Foole,
given that they follow the Humean strategy H. So if the Foole offensively violates at
the initial round, then the best the Foole can do afterwards is to continue to follow A by
following D in each subsequent round of play. Since all in the community expect that
m [ 1 ? gj for each community member j, the Foole should expect to do worse if he
offensively violates in the beginning than he would if he follows P, which he would
follow if he were to adopt the Humean strategy like his fellow community members.
So the Foole should not offensively violate at the initial round of play. And if the state
where everyone in the community follows H is an equilibrium of the indefinitely
repeated game, then by an exactly similar argument one can show the Foole that he
should expect to fare strictly worse if he offensively violates at any round of play than
he fares if he obeys Hobbes’ natural law and consistently performs with his Humean
counterparts. This possibility depends upon how likely each community member
believes a continuation of the indefinitely repeated game to be after a given round of play.
The probability a community member assigns to the event that the repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma will be played an additional round after the current round is her discount factor.
Using a random matching model similar in spirit to those Kandori (1992) and Ellison
(1994) develop in their seminal essays on community enforcement, I proved the relevant
folk theorems that show that if the community members’ discount factors are all
sufficiently high, the Humean strategy H indeed characterizes an equilibrium of this
indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (Vanderschraaf 2007). So if the members of a
community are sufficiently confident that their opportunities to engage in covenants with
the Fig. 3 Prisoners’ Dilemma structure will continue in the future, then everyone
including the Foole does better to follow H than to offensively violate.
Did Hobbes refute the Foole, as Hobbes seems to have thought? Given the folk-
theorem interpretation, the answer to this question is plainly: ‘‘It depends.’’ The
Prisoners’ Dilemma is the simplest nontrivial game that summarizes the actions
associated with a covenant, but one can prove the relevant folk theorems for games
that summarize covenants with more complex structures, such as covenants having a
Farmers’ Dilemma structure. If the Humean strategy characterizes an equilibrium
for a community whose members regularly must choose whether or not to perform
their respective ends of covenants, and if the Foole expects his fellow community
members to all follow the Humean strategy, then the Foole’s best response is to
consistently perform. But these are rather big ifs! The Foole might challenge the
claim that the Humean strategy characterizes an equilibrium of the repeated game.
What if some of the members’ discount factors are not sufficiently high, as might be
the case if they expect the community to break up in the near future? Hobbes will
have to hedge his reply and assert that the Foole should expect to live in a stable
community whose members expect to interact with each other for a long time, so
that their discount factors will be sufficiently high. Perhaps this is a plausible
assumption, but we see already that the persuasive force of Hobbes’ response to the
Foole depends upon context. If the Foole interacts with others in a sufficiently
unstable community, then offensive violation might be the Foole’s best response to
others’ performance after all, given that the Foole thinks it sufficiently unlikely that
the sequence of covenants in this community will continue.
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The Foole can raise other serious objections to Hobbes’ defense of his third law
of nature. Kavka (1983, 1986) supplied the Foole with one such objection, an
objection Skyrms subsequently refined in his essay ‘The Shadow of the Future’
(1998). Kavka and Skyrms argue that if one modifies in a seemingly innocuous way
the assumption in the folk-theorem interpretation that interactions continue for an
indefinitely long time horizon, then it is never rational to perform. Here is a
summary of their objection: Suppose it is common knowledge in the community
that for some value u, no one lives to see his uth opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
others’ reciprocal cooperation.13 (A plausible upper bound on the number of
possible interactions is u = 1, 000, 000.) If the u-1st round of repeated covenant
games like Prisoners’ or Farmers’ dilemmas were somehow to be reached, the
parties should analyze this game as a single-shot game, there being no subsequent
round of play. Thus parties familiar with the reasoning of Hobbes’ Foole and
Hume’s farmers would not perform at this round. But if this is the case, then the
parties can disregard the future play should the u-2nd round be reached, and so this
potential round should be analyzed as a single-shot game, and thus the parties would
not perform for the same reason they would not perform at the u-1st round. And the
same reasoning applies to the u-3rd potential round, and the u-4th potential round,
and so on. By this backwards induction argument, or an appropriately strengthened
version of it, the Foole can conclude that rational parties never perform, in which
case the Foole would act against reason were he to obey Hobbes’ third law. Skyrms
observes that the force of Hobbes’ response to the Foole depends crucially upon
common knowledge conditions that Hobbes does not consider. If the community
members are rational, know the structure of the indefinitely repeated game, but lack
common knowledge of an upper bound to the number of covenant games they might
play, then they will be unable to anchor the just described backwards induction
argument. Consequently they might follow some equilibrium better for all than the
all-follow-A equilibrium. But, perhaps paradoxically, if the community members
have common knowledge of the game, their rationality and an upper bound to the
number of interactions, then the Foole can conclude that the only possible outcome
is the all-follow-A equilibrium (Skyrms 1998, pp. 16–19).
As just noted, the backwards induction argument of the previous paragraph relies
upon an ideal common knowledge assumption that might not obtain in actual
communities. Yet even if we return to the original assumption that from the
perspective of the community members, their interactions are played out over an
indefinitely long time horizon, and even if the Humean strategy defines an
equilibrium of the repeated interaction, the Foole can mount still another objection.
Skyrms recognizes the gist of this objection. Skyrms notes that the folk-theorem
argument he attributes to Hobbes shows only that consistently refraining from
offensive violations of covenants can be consistent with rational prudence. But
Hobbes is evidently trying to show the Foole that refraining from offensive
13 A proposition A is common knowledge among a group if each member of the group knows that all in
the group know A and knows that all in the group can infer the consequences of this mutual knowledge
(Lewis 1969, pp. 56–57).
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violations must be consistent with rational prudence. The folk-theorem argument
does not vindicate this stronger claim, because the indefinitely repeated game has
equilibria other than the equilibrium of the Humean strategy, and at some of these
equilibria the parties do not always perform with innocent counterparts. For
example, if all follow A, then they are at one of these uncooperative equilibria
(Skyrms 1998, p. 16). The Foole can develop this objection as follows: If parties can
follow a history dependent strategy like H, then why should they not be able to
follow other history dependent strategies that Hobbes, and Hume after him, never
consider? If the parties can choose from a sufficiently rich set of history dependent
strategies, then a whole continuum of different equilibria of the indefinitely repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma game become possible. Indeed, there are even equilibria of the
indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma that are optimal like the equilibrium of
the Humean strategy, but where some of the parties exploit other parties some of
the time and hence fare even better than they would fare at the all-H equilibrium
(Kreps 1990; Vanderschraaf 2007). Which, if any, of all these equilibria should the
Foole expect the members of his community to follow?
In his reply to the Foole, Hobbes assumes that the Foole interacts with the
members of a community who all follow H. In fact, each community member has
literally infinitely many different strategies to choose from in the indefinitely
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Suppose the Foole enters into a covenant with another
party, and this other party performs first. If, as Hobbes supposes, the Foole interacts
in a community where the others all follow the Humean strategy, then he had better
perform if his expectations that he will continue to interact with these others is
sufficiently high. But if the Foole is in a community where most of the others reason
as Hume’s farmers reason, then in this particular covenant the Foole may have an
opportunity to exploit another and actually achieve a net gain. For if the Foole lives
in a community whose members are mostly following the all-A equilibrium to begin
with, then why should the Foole not take advantage of any rare occasions that might
come up where the other party actually performs? Or suppose the Foole is in a
community whose members consistently perform in covenants. Their behavior is
compatible with their following the all-H equilibrium, in which case H is a best
response for the Foole if he expects to remain in this community for a sufficiently
long time. However, their behavior is also compatible with their all following a
simpler strategy than H, namely, follow P always. If the Foole interacts with others
who follow P unconditionally in each round of the indefinitely repeated game, then
the Foole’s best response is to follow D in every covenant. For now the Foole can
‘‘fleece’’ the community of ‘‘suckers’’. Hobbes’ reply to the Foole assumes crucially
that the Foole interacts with others who follow some strategy that rewards
performance in covenants with reciprocal performance and punishes offensive
violation with defensive violation. Hobbes gives no argument for why this should be
the case.
Still, perhaps one can at least partially rescue Hobbes’ response to the Foole if
one allows for another possibility Hobbes does not consider, namely, that norms of
reciprocity might evolve in societies. Sugden (1986, pp. 116–117) examines another
conditionally cooperative strategy for playing the indefinitely repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma:
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Tn: If innocent, follow D in a covenant with a guilty counterpart party of the
covenant, and follow P otherwise.
where here a party is innocent if, and only if, she has never offensively violated a
covenant or she has performed n times after an offensive violation. Sugden’s
strategy generalizes the strategy for playing repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with a
fixed counterpart known as tit-for-tat (Axelrod 1984). Unlike the Humean strategy,
Tn is forgiving, since an offensive violator can regain his innocence by performing n
times after she becomes guilty. Sugden proves that if all in a community follow Tn,
then they are at an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma if
their discount factors are sufficiently high. This equilibrium yields each community
member the same expected payoff she would achieve by following the all-follow-H
equilibrium. Unlike the equilibrium of the Humean strategy, the equilibrium of the
Tn strategy is self-correcting, that is, the community members can return to the state
where all follow P after a community member offensively violates. Sugden also
proves that Tn is error stable, that is, Tn is the unique best response if the others also
follow Tn, with the caveat that at each period each community member with some
positive probability deviates from Tn by mistake (1986, pp. 117–118).
14 Sugden
argues that equilibria of brave reciprocity like the all-follow-Tn equilibrium are
likely to evolve in communities (1986, pp. 119–125). If Sugden is right, then we
have an evolutionary explanation for the emergence of a strategy similar to the
Humean strategy Hobbes attributes to community members in his response to the
Foole. This would plug the gap in Hobbes’ folk-theorem argument, at the negligible
cost of replacing the Humean strategy with the more forgiving Tn strategy. Indeed,
perhaps replacing H with Tn in Hobbes’ argument is advantageous to Hobbes. In
real human societies, everyone makes mistakes. If it were literally true that real
people follow the Humean strategy, then in time in a community of fallible
individuals no one would ever perform in covenants because ultimately everyone
would be guilty because of a past offensive violation, either by choice or by
mistake. Tn is still punitive, but eventually forgives transgressions, which is likely to
reflect the way real people react to offensive violations of covenants.
However, Sugden does not address one crucial question. Hobbes and Hume also
fail to address this question. How do the community members know who are
innocent? If community members cannot reliably distinguish innocent from guilty
counterparts, then they simply cannot follow strategies such as H or Tn. In his
community enforcement model, Kandori assumes that when parties meet, they
exchange credentials that accurately indicate to each other whether the counterpart
is innocent or guilty. Kandori likens this to presenting a merchant a credit card. But
as he acknowledges, Kandori does not consider the possibility that parties might try
to present fraudulent credentials (Kandori 1992, p. 71). Gaylord and D’Andria
(1998) explore the possibility that a community can successfully enforce the
Humean strategy in repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma via informal communication.
They test this claim using a computer model of agents who meet in an indefinitely
14 Error stability is not the same as the evolutionary stability of Maynard Smith (1982). As is now well




repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma and who exchange with each other their ‘‘blacklists’’
of individuals they know to be guilty when they meet. Gaylord and D’Andria show
that over time, the agents who follow the Humean strategy fare better than the
agents who offensively violate. This would suggest that community members can
know how to follow strategies like H and Tn simply via informal gossip. However,
Gaylord and D’Andria assume in their computer model that each agent’s ‘‘blacklist’’
includes the identities of only agents who are offensive violators. In effect, Gaylord
and D’Andria assume that everyone tells the truth always. Elsewhere I show that if
one extends their computer model to allow for the possibility that agents include the
identities of innocent counterparts on their ‘‘blacklists’’, then offensive violators
who add the identities of their innocent victims to their ‘‘blacklists’’ now fare better
than Humean strategy followers (Vanderschraaf 2007). For once H-followers meet
these offensive violators, they start to apply the Humean strategy incorrectly,
punishing innocent victims when they should punish the guilty. This suggests that if
a community relies upon informal gossip alone, then a Foole who not only
offensively violates but lies and claims his victims offensively violated against him
can successfully exploit his community.
So how can the members of a community successfully follow strategies like H or Tn?
They can follow such strategies if their communities have certain institutions that
facilitate common knowledge. For example, merchants and consumers successfully
exchange services and goods using credit cards because it is common knowledge in
the community of credit users that passing certain screening programs indicates that
the owner of the credit card is in good credit standing. Credit grantors and merchants
follow a strategy similar to the Humean strategy, and extend credit or accept payment
with a credit card exactly with those they identify as being in good credit standing. The
common knowledge that certain screening programs reliably indicate good credit
standing is possible in part due to the existence of credit bureaus that record the
reports of credit grantors regarding their customers. Obviously, the system of
credit exchange could break down if too many of the reports submitted by credit
grantors are inaccurate, or if the online credit reporting program is compromised.
But this only underscores the more general point that communities can follow
equilibria of brave reciprocity only under certain circumstances. Skyrms argues
that if the community members have too much common knowledge, then they will
be unable to follow the all-H equilibrium. I have argued here that community
members might also be unable to follow equilibria of brave reciprocity like all-H
or all-Tn if they have too little common knowledge. In any event, Skyrms’ and my
alternate arguments lead to the same conclusion. Hobbes’ reply to the Foole is
inconclusive.
5 Responses to the Invisible Foole
At first blush, one might think that the challenge of the Invisible Foole is
unanswerable. As noted in Sect. 3, the Invisible Foole will not accept any justice-
Platonist argument that purportedly shows that he should refrain from injustice.
And as he possesses the ring of Gyges, the Invisible Foole seems to have no good
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justice-conventionalist reasons to refrain from injustice. So the Invisible Foole
appears to have no prudential reason to be just.
In this concluding section I will argue that here appearances are deceiving, and
that the Invisible Foole can have good justice-conventionalist reasons to perform in
covenants as Hobbes’ third law of nature requires. The arguments in this section
draw upon ideas from the folk-theorem interpretation of Hobbes’ response to the
Foole in Leviathan discussed in Sect. 4. The leading idea here is that the members of
a community might follow somewhat more complex and more punitive strategies
than the forgiving strategies of brave reciprocity discussed above. In particular, an
Invisible Foole who offensively violates using the ring might spark a cycle of
completely unforgiving behavior among the others that will cost the Invisible Foole
in the long run. If this is the case, then the Invisible Foole can have good reason to
refrain from offensive violations in order to minimize the risk of launching such a
cycle of unrelenting punishment.
A first such justice-conventionalist response to the Invisible Foole is motivated
by another objection Socrates might have raised against Glaucon’s challenge,
namely, that the power of concealment the invisibility ring gives the Invisible Foole
could be transitory. After all, one can lose a ring. And the power of an invisibility
ring might expire unexpectedly. Additionally, if one has in the past taken advantage
of absolute or near absolute power to exploit others and then loses this power, one is
liable to suffer a particularly severe punishment for these past offenses. In their
classic exchange in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, the Melians warn the
Athenians that should the Athenians treat them unjustly while they remain helpless,
the Athenians may well suffer a terrible punishment should they one day find
themselves helpless. In time, the Melians were proved right. One could present the
Invisible Foole with these and other examples, and advise the Invisible Foole
against offensive violation on the grounds that should the Invisible Foole lose the
concealment power of the invisibility ring, he will be liable to suffer a similarly
severe punishment.
To show how this response to the Invisible Foole can have bite, suppose the
members of a community are engaged in the indefinitely repeated game described in
Sect. 4 where at each period, one is matched in a Prisoners’ Dilemma with a
counterpart in the community and the counterparts can vary over time. Suppose
further that the relevant institutions exist that facilitate common knowledge, so that
the community members can follow equilibria of brave reciprocity. The Invisible
Foole will be tempted to use the ring to enter into a given covenant appearing to be
someone else, and then become invisible when it is his time to perform. If the
community follows the all-T1 equilibrium, then they will identify the individual the
Invisible Foole impersonated as guilty and punish him instead of punishing the
Invisible Foole. The hapless victim will have to suffer the punishment and perform
with a counterpart who does not perform to regain his innocence, since to do
otherwise would leave this victim even worse off. But suppose the community
members all follow a variant of the T1 strategy:
c*: Always follow D with a counterpart known to have used an invisibility
ring in an offensive violation, and otherwise follow T1 with one’s counterpart.
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In other words, community members will forgive an offensive violator who does not
conceal his identity and who serves his punishment, but they never forgive one they
discover to have used an invisibility ring in offensive violations. A community
might have such a draconian rule for dealing with a known ring user partly because
ring users are so dangerous to deal with in individual covenants, and partly because
ring users lead others to mistakenly punish members who did not offensively violate
covenants. Let q denote the probability that in a given period the community
members discover the identity of one who has used an invisibility ring to commit
injustices, perhaps because the power of the ring expires. Then one can prove a folk
theorem showing that if q and the discount factors are sufficiently high, then the
community members follow an optimal equilibrium if they all follow c*. If the
community follow the all c*-equilibrium, then the Invisible Foole can expect to do
worse if he deviates from c* and offensively violates using the ring than if he
performs in his covenants with the innocent (Vanderschraaf 2008). So if one relaxes
the assumption that the invisibility ring is certain to conceal a user’s identity
perfectly for all time, then the Invisible Foole can have good justice-conventionalist
reasons to be just, after all.
The assumption that the Invisible Foole could lose the concealment power of the
ring might be plausible, but one might object that this assumption allows me to
obtain a desired conclusion on the cheap. After all, in his exchange with Glaucon
and Adeimantus, Socrates never helps himself to this assumption. Socrates accepts
the challenge of the Lydian Shepherd in its strongest form, and does not question the
assumption that the ring of Gyges conceals one’s identity perfectly all of the time.
Consequently, Socrates presses a justice-Platonist defense of the prudential
rationality of justice because he thinks this is the only kind of defense he can
press. What if the Invisible Foole presses his case and claims he is confident he will
never lose the power of concealment the ring gives him? Then by hypothesis the
community will never be able to identify the Invisible Foole as the guilty party
when the Invisible Foole offensively violates. So it would seem that the community
members cannot punish the Invisible Foole, in which case he has no good reason to
perform in his covenants. But the justice-conventionalist has one final card to play.
The community members now cannot punish the Invisible Foole directly for his
injustices, because they can never discover who commits these injustices. However,
the Invisible Foole should consider the possibility of suffering indirect punishment.
If the Invisible Foole offensively violates covenants while concealing his identity,
then his conduct might tend to undermine the willingness of others to perform in
covenants with anyone. And if the community members stop following the norm
that requires them to perform in covenants with the innocent, then no one will be
able to enjoy the benefits of others’ performance in covenants, including the
Invisible Foole. So one can develop a second justice-conventionalist response to the
Invisible Foole based upon indirect punishment.
Hume hints at the possibility of indirect punishment in his discussion of
conventions in A Treatise of Human Nature (Treatise 3.2.5: 9) and of the Sensible
Knave at the end of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Enquiry 9.2:
22). Again, one can use game theory to show how this response to the Invisible
Foole can have persuasive force. Suppose the members of a community are once
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more engaged in the indefinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game described
above, but this time they follow a strategy that does not always distinguish between
the guilty and the innocent:
d*: Follow T1 at the initial period t = 1, and for each period t [ 1, continue to
follow T1 or change to A (always follow D) according to the following rule: (i)
If at period t one follows T1 and one’s counterpart i(t) does not offensively
violate, then at period t ? 1 continue to follow T1, (ii) If at period t one
follows T1 and one’s counterpart i(t) offensively violates, then at period t ? 1
with probability p continue to follow T1, and with probability 1 - p follow A,
and (iii) If at period t one follows A, then at period t ? 1 follow A.
Now each community member continues to follow T1 until he meets an offensive
violator, in which case with probability p he continues to follow T1 but with
probability 1 - p changes irrevocably to following A. Intuitively, each time a d*-
follower who has been forgiving meets an offensive violator, there is some chance
that this d*-follower loses patience and starts to punish everyone she meets all of the
time. If the Invisible Foole uses his ring to commit injustices, he might start a
contagion of nonperformance in covenants that will lead to a collapse of social
cooperation, in which case the Invisible Foole will lose the gains of free riding on
others’ justice. One can prove another folk theorem similar to the community
enforcement folk theorems of Kandori (1992) that shows that if the discount factors
are sufficiently high, then the community members follow an optimal equilibrium if
they all follow d*. The Invisible Foole can expect to fare strictly worse if he
deviates from this all d*-equilibrium and offensively violates (Vanderschraaf 2008).
In this case, the Invisible Foole should perform in his covenants as justice requires
even if he is sure he can conceal his identity in covenants, because he prefers to
avoid the indirect punishment that he will suffer should he trigger a contagion of A-
following with an offensive violation.
Plainly, the two justice-conventionalist responses to the Invisible Foole proposed
here are inconclusive, and for much the same reasons Hobbes’ response to the Foole
of Leviathan interpreted as a proto-folk-theorem response is inconclusive. In
particular, the Invisible Foole can note that he has no a priori reason to assume that
those he encounters will ever start following such relentlessly punitive strategies
that are the backbone of the direct and indirect punishment arguments of this
section. And historical examples of the terrible punishments that follow after some
mighty individual or state falls from power are at best thin anecdotal evidence for
the claim that these punitive strategies would tend to evolve in societies in which
some members had the concealment power of the invisibility ring. The most the
analysis here shows is that the Invisible Foole can have good justice-conventionalist
reasons to refrain from injustice. If conditions are such that the members of society
can and do follow sufficiently punitive strategies of direct or indirect punishment,
then the Invisible Foole should obey Hobbes’ third law of nature even if he has the
ring of Gyges. Under different conditions, where the members of society cannot or
will not be so punitive, then to commit injustices using the ring might be the
Invisible Foole’s prudentially rational choice. So the justice-conventionalist
refutation of the Invisible Foole is no more decisive than Hobbes’ reply to the
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Foole of Leviathan. But perhaps this is not so bad. I believe that none of the justice-
Platonist or justice-conventionalist arguments philosophers have proposed that
purportedly reconcile justice with rational prudence succeed perfectly. I have
argued here that an Invisible Foole can have some good justice-conventionalist
reasons for performing in covenants as justice requires. This conclusion appears to
differ from what Plato thought and what some of his contemporary successors
(Gauthier 1990; Copp 1997) have thought. Perhaps philosophers will never fully
complete the reconciliation project. But perhaps the response to the Invisible Foole
proposed in this essay is a small step towards doing so.
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